Comprehending Putin: The Unconsidered Resolution for the Russia-Ukraine Conflict

The statesmanlike strategist has always been set apart from ordinary ideologues and low-class politicians by his ability to assess an opponent's politico-military capabilities and, more crucially, his political thinking, strategic goals, and dispositions on the use of force.

The assessment of a country's legitimate and genuine security interests as they arise from its geopolitical position, demographics, economic and military potentials, neighbors, and other pertinent statecraft factors has always been at the core of understanding what has been called its "Strategic Culture."

In today's corrupt political power centers of the US and Europe, all of this has been fully reversed. Instead of evaluating the potential adversary, so-called national security specialists instead hate him and discount any security claims he may make. In doing so, they underestimate the enemy, exaggerate their own power, and ignore the will of the people as a whole, all driven by delusions of global domination.

In the same way, everyone who tries to understand the enemy's strategic concepts in order to avert war or, in the event that it cannot be avoided, effectively wage war, is now called a traitor, a puppet of Putin, or a turncoat who puts his own country in jeopardy.

The criteria for successful warfare – reaching politico-military objectives in the shortest possible time with minimum loss of life and damage to friend and foe – have been replaced by protracted conflict to reach dubious strategic and economic goals with no regard to lives lost, nation’s and world regions devastated.

But there can be no peace and unjust wars will continue to be fought if you do not know your enemy, take into account his strategic objectives and interests in national security, and conduct international relations policies based on accepted principles of international law and underlying ethical considerations.

The security elites in the US and Europe must accept that they made mistakes in the current Russia-Ukraine War, alienating Russia and her justifiable security needs regarding Ukraine, supporting the despicable Zelensky regime, and pursuing a harmful course of action toward the Russian Federation.

In order to put an end to the war, Zelensky and his fascist regime must be ousted, Ukraine must be split, with the conquered territories temporarily remaining under Russian control, and a new government must be established in Kiev that is able to cooperate with both the east and the west and is prepared to forgo joining NATO or engaging in any other type of military cooperation with the United States and its allies.

The further neglect of Russia’s national security interests and the continued disregard for the existential significance of Ukraine’s strategic orientation for its eastern neighbor will lead to further escalation and potentially World War III.

How to Resolve the North Korea Crisis!

When back in the days of President Jimmy Carter, the U.S. gave North Korea technology for nuclear reactors and a few billion bucks on top of it, only gullible liberals believed that the regime would use atomic capability only for peaceful purposes.

Every serious scholar and student of international relations, then as well as today, knows that nuclear armament – even when it’s only a few warheads – is the big equalizer in terms of national security. It balances out any inferiority in terms of conventional armed forces, size of the country, demographics, and economic capacity. During the roughly forty years of the Cold War, it was the paradox of nuclear deterrence and the so aptly abbreviated (MAD) Mutually Assured Destruction that prevented any severe conventional wars from breaking out. The likelihood of any conflict escalating to the level of nuclear warfare reduced the chances for a conventional war on a larger scale.

Given the historically burdened ideological antagonism toward the West, it was to expect that North Korea would strive to become a nuclear power at all cost – even at the expense of lying to treaty partners and the international community and making pledges it never intended to keep. After all the leniency and unsuccessful attempts at appeasement under Carter in the 1970ies, Clinton in the 1990ies, and the do-nothing strategy of so-called strategic patience under Obama, it is now too late to prevent North Korea from becoming a nuclear power, albeit it a minor one.

It appears that we have somehow returned to the conditions that dominated a particular dimension of international relations during the Cold War, which means the hysteria on the part of the Strategic Community in the U.S. is unwarranted – and so is President Trump’s martial rhetoric.

Against the backdrop of the U.S.’ unmatched military means in terms of global power projection and nuclear capabilities, I propose a two-tier solution to resolve the conflict with North Korea. These measures would allow avoiding further escalation and avert unnecessary distress for international relations and potentially affected populations:

1. The stratagem of ‘Deterrence by Denial’ has to be applied by implementing all capabilities for missile defense and interception on the Korean peninsula and all other potential target areas for North Korean ballistic missiles, be it the west coast of the U.S., Guam, or other regions and locales. These aggressive military steps have to join hands with civil defense measures for the protection of populations and vital military and civilian infrastructure that help minimize any damage in the unlikely event of being impacted by the use of weapons of mass destruction.

2. The promise of ‘Annihilation upon 1st Strike’ has to be plausibly and assuredly threatened to the regime in North Korea. The U.S. must unmistakably convey through diplomatic channels and public discourse that it does not intend to use nuclear weapons against North Korea first. However, it will annihilate North Korea if North Korea uses nuclear weapons against the U.S. or any of its allies. Despite its seemingly irrational rhetoric, the regime of Kim Jong Un will not invite destruction upon themselves and their country.

There is no need for preemptive strikes to take out North Korean weaponry or delivery systems. The cost in human lives would be too high, total success uncertain, and retaliation most probable. If it comes to this, the U.S. and the rest of the world would be able to live with the fact that North Korea and its autocratic regime avail over some nuclear armament and feel powerful and on level par with other nuclear-armed nations around the world. However, like all the others, it will be condemned never to use them unless they want to bring Armageddon over their people.

While implementing this strategy and defusing the danger of thermonuclear, all diplomatic and other means of conflict resolution and appeasement can and should be used to keep the radical North Korean regime in check and further neutralize the threat.

Dealing with North Korea in the proposed way should usher the United States into a long-overdue new era of measured foreign affairs and national security policy that relinquishes the overly self-centered geostrategic arrogance and hubris of the past two decades.