Why the West Misread the Post-Cold War World: What Fukuyama, Huntington, and Strauss–Howe Still Teach Us About the New International Order

Thirty-five years after the end of the Cold War, the optimism that shaped the 1990s has largely disappeared. The liberal international order, once regarded as the inevitable destination of history under the unipolar direction of the United States, is under pressure and in retreat. Russia has returned as a geopolitical challenger. China has emerged as a global rival. Europe faces internal fragmentation, while the United States itself is deeply polarized. Rather than entering an era of perpetual peace and balanced global stability, the world has returned to great-power rivalry, geopolitical instability, a multipolar design and even faces a year-long war in Europe.

This outcome was not inevitable. Nor was it entirely unpredictable. It resulted from poor political choices throughout.

Three of the most influential political thinkers of the 1990s—Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington, and William Strauss and Neil Howe—identified remarkably different, and yet equally essential inte rpretationsof the post-Cold War world. Yet Western policymakers either misunderstood or ignored their deeper insights.

Understanding these theories today is not only critical for understanding why Western strategy has repeatedly failed over the past three decades but, even more importantly, to cast a prosperous way forward.

Recognition Before Power

Francis Fukuyama became famous for proclaiming "the End of History." His argument, however, has often been reduced to the prediction that liberal democracy had permanently triumphed in the ideological evolution of mankind.

But this was not his central philosophical insight for organizing international relations.

Drawing upon Hegel and Plato, Fukuyama argued that human beings seek, individually and as collectives, not only material prosperity and well-being but also recognition—thymos, the desire for dignity, respect, and equal standing.

This dimension was largely ignored after 1991.

Rather than integrating Russia into a genuinely new European security architecture based on equal partnership, the West increasingly treated Russia as a defeated power expected to adapt unconditionally to an expanding liberal order. NATO enlargement, successive interventions, and support for political transformations throughout the post-Soviet space were interpreted in Western capitals as the natural expansion of democracy.

In Moscow they were perceived differently: as strategic encirclement and denial of recognition.

Dismissing this psychological and political dimension proved to be a profound strategic mistake. Stable international order cannot rest upon attempted unilateral military dominance. It also requires mutual recognition among major powers. A denial of these parameters triggers resistance and defiance.

This is why ignoring Fukuyama's concept of recognition contributed significantly to today's confrontation.

Civilizations Never Disappeared

If Fukuyama emphasized recognition, Samuel Huntington emphasized identity.

In The Clash of Civilizations, Huntington argued that the ideological conflicts of the twentieth century would increasingly give way to conflicts rooted in civilization, culture, and religion. The principal dividing lines would no longer be political borders but competing cultural worlds.

Many critics dismissed Huntington as overly pessimistic.

Events since then suggest otherwise.

The assumption that liberal democracy represented a universally attractive destination underestimated the enduring importance of civilizational identity. Russia increasingly defined itself through Orthodox Christianity and sovereign statehood and looked with disdain at the civilizational deterioration of the West. China emphasized its own civilizational continuity. Large parts of the Islamic world resisted Western liberal universalism. In Europe and North America, debates over national identity, immigration, and cultural cohesion became increasingly central.

The Western tendency to interpret international politics primarily through liberal luniversal values frequently overlooked these deeper cultural realities.

This does not imply that civilizations are destined for conflict. It does suggest though that a lasting international order requires respect for civilizational diversity and overcoming the assumption that all societies across the globe will eventually adopt the model offered and imposed by the West.

History Moves in Cycles

The least discussed—but perhaps most intriguing—theory comes from William Strauss and Neil Howe.

Their book The Fourth Turning proposed that Anglo-American history develops through recurring generational cycles of roughly eighty to one hundred years. Each cycle culminates in a period of profound institutional crisis—a "Fourth Turning"—during which political orders are fundamentally transformed.

Whether one accepts the theory literally is less important than recognizing its explanatory power.

The financial crisis of 2008, Brexit, the COVID-19 pandemic, increasing political polarization, declining trust in institutions, and renewed geopolitical rivalry all resemble the characteristics Strauss and Howe associated with systemic crisis.

Their theory also helps explain the rise of political movements rejecting the assumptions of the post-Cold War era.

In this context, Donald Trump's "America First" foreign policy appears less as an historical anomaly than as a symptom of a broader structural transition. It reflects growing scepticism toward global interventionism, puts increasing emphasis on national sovereignty, and a reassessment of America's strategic priorities.

Whether one supports or opposes these policies is secondary. Of primary importance is the realization that they represent deeper historical forces rather than merely temporary political preferences.

From Wilsonian Universalism to Strategic Realism

Taken together, these three theories reveal a common weakness in Western strategy after the Cold War.

The dominant foreign-policy establishment increasingly embraced a Wilsonian vision of international politics based upon democratic universalism, humanitarian intervention, and the expansion of a liberal international order.

This approach often underestimated the three enduring realities introduced here:

First, nations seek recognition, not merely economic integration. Second, civilizations preserve distinct historical identities that cannot simply be transformed through political engineering. Third, historical orders eventually reach points of exhaustion requiring strategic adaptation rather than ideological persistence.

The failed policies resulted in a succession of costly strategic disappointments—from Iraq and Libya to the deterioration of relations with Russia and the outbreak of war in Ukraine.

The problem was not the probably good-willed aspiration toward peace or democracy. The problem was the misconception that these objectives could be achieved while ignoring power, history, identity, and recognition.

 

A Multipolar Future

The liberal international order is not simply collapsing. It is being transformed.

The emerging world is increasingly multipolar. Great powers pursue distinct civilizational interests. National sovereignty has returned as a central organizing principle of international politics. Strategic competition has replaced assumptions of inevitable convergence.

Recognizing this reality does not require abandoning liberal values in whatever configuration they are present in Western societies. It certainly requires abandoning the belief that those values alone can organize international politics.

A more durable international order will depend upon mutual recognition among major powers, respect for cultural diversity, and a realistic understanding of geopolitical interests.

The post-Cold War era demonstrated the limits of ideological certainty. The decades ahead will demand something different: strategic prudence grounded in political philosophy rather than political wishful thinking.

The insights of Fukuyama, Huntington, and Strauss–Howe remain valuable precisely because they remind us that successful statecraft begins not with universal power aspirations but with a clear understanding of human nature, historical development, and the enduring diversity of civilizations. Only by recovering these insights can the West hope to navigate an increasingly complex international order. 

If Fukuyama, Huntington, and Strauss–Howe each illuminate one dimension of political reality, what philosophical framework can reconcile their insights within a single theory of strategy? This question forms the point of departure for my next essay, where I introduce Idealistic Realism—an attempt to recover the transcendental foundations of strategic thought that have largely disappeared from contemporary international relations. Without such philosophical grounding, strategy risks becoming little more than the management of power without wisdom.

Is The War On Iran Justified? (Video description and link)

 YouTube Video: Is The War on Iran Just? (https://youtu.be/m2LFFmOrDe8)

Is the war on Iran justified? Not strategically — morally. 

In this video, I apply Just War theory — a 1,500-year-old ethical tradition from Augustine and Thomas Aquinas — to Operation Epic Fury and the ongoing war on Iran. 

I examine each of the six criteria a war must meet to be considered just: 

✦ Just Cause — Was the nuclear threat truly imminent? ✦ Right Intention — Security, or regime change? ✦ Legitimate Authority — Who authorized this war? ✦ Proportionality — Will the consequences exceed the threat? ✦ Last Resort — Were all alternatives exhausted? ✦ Reasonable Prospect of Success — What does victory look like? 

 

The verdict may not be what you expect. 

🔗 Related videos: ▸ Why Do Security Strategies Fail So Often? [https://youtu.be/78x4ZZbZTtI] ▸ Machiavelli vs. Kant — The Real Tragedy of Ukraine: [https://youtu.be/NodiZe1hkKk] 

⏱️ Timestamps: 

0:00 — Is this war just? 

1:25 — Just War Theory designed for restraint! 

2:10 — Why theory matters 

3:58 — Ius ad bellum and Ius in bello 

5:31 — The UN Charter and the prohibition of force 

7:03 — When sovereignty collapses: the Just War criteria 

8:36 — Applying the framework to Iran 

18:05 — The verdict 

20:31 — Have we entered a post-normative world? 

 #iran #justwar #operationepicfury #geopolitics #philosophy #justwartheory #iranwar #iranwar2026 #politicalphilosophy

Why Military Force Cannot Save Ukraine

 

https://youtu.be/p45m4KYYRRI?si=DIR3ZKRUTeOMAng- 

The final video, Part III, of my trilogy on Ukraine & Peace. Link to previous parts in video and end-screen! (Deutsche Untertitel im Video verfügbar!) 

Ignorance, Causality, and the Lost Conditions of Peace: Why the Ukraine War Cannot Be Understood—Let Alone Ended—Without Sound Theory

What the Ukraine war has revealed with unusual clarity is not merely a crisis of security, but a crisis of judgment. This issue remains unresolved in ongoing peace negotiations, which only deepen the dilemma rather than resolve it. Consequently, these discussions have failed to yield meaningful progress towards peace.

At the core of this failure lies a fundamental epistemological error: the inversion of cause and effect. Friedrich Nietzsche, in his work Twilight of the Idols, identified this confusion as one of the most persistent and dangerous mistakes in human reasoning. He argued that people tend to moralize outcomes while ignoring the conditions that produced them and tend to treat effects as origins while elevating consequences into causes.

This error is not confined to mental acrobatics and philosophical speculations where it might lead to a stalemate in debate. In politics it results in catastrophic outcomes affecting real lives.

The war in Ukraine is commonly depicted as a geopolitical rupture—a sudden breakdown of order, an eruption of irrational aggression, a moral shock to Europe. Although this interpretation appears comforting, it is fundamentally incorrect. Wars of this magnitude do not arise from fleeting moments of madness; rather, they emerge from long chains of reasoning, diplomatic efforts, and moral failures that precede the first shot fired by years, sometimes even decades.

The case in point is Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014—eight years before the war’s commencement. In Western political and media narratives, Russia’s annexation of Crimea is frequently cited as the origin of the conflict and as a first step in supposed imperial expansion.

However, this interpretation reverses cause and effect and lays a harmful judgmental error at the foundation of the conflict.

Following the Maidan uprising, Russia faced—for the first time—a government in Kiev openly committed to NATO membership and hostile to Russian strategic interests. This was not a marginal concern. It directly threatened Russia’s access to the Black Sea and the operational viability of its southern naval forces.

In strategic terms, therefore, the annexation of Crimea was not an expansionist indulgence, but a defensive necessity. One may dislike this reality. But once ignored strategic reasoning is abandoned altogether; a neglect that has persisted ever since.

The same error in thinking – inverting cause and effect – has been applied to Russia’s Special Military Operation (SMO) that began in February 2022.

The prevailing Western narrative treats Russia’s military action as the cause of the conflict, rather than its effect. Acceptance of this false reversal—which is widespread among Western security elites—leads to the collapse of moral judgment into mythology. Responsibility, guilt, and blame are assigned without thorough and impartial analysis, diplomacy degenerates into provocation, and war is recast as one-sided righteousness and political necessity, rather than acknowledged failure and moral disaster.

Strategic literacy—seemingly rare nowadays—once provided a safeguard against such illusions. Carl von Clausewitz already made us understand that war is never an isolated act; it is the continuation of political conflict by other means, embedded in context, and shaped by threat perceptions, ideological aspirations, and power ambitions. Western leaders have insisted that Russia launched a War of Aggression “without provocation,” a demonstrably false claim.

For years, Russia clearly and consistently articulated the existential threat posed by NATO expansion into Ukraine. Diplomatic channels were pursued and red lines were stated, but proposals were rejected or dismissed—at which point the strategic situation crossed a classical threshold.

While International Law does not explicitly address preemptive war—except possibly as an exception under Article 51's Collective Defense Clause—preemptive war is neither new nor inherently illegitimate from a moral perspective.

As previously explained in my blog essay of August 12/08/2025, “Alaska Summit: President Trump is Setting Himself Up for Failure! No Peace Without Ending Zelensky’s Destructive Role and Changing the EU’s Flawed Stance,” strategic theory suggests that preemptive action may be justified when existential threats are imminent, diplomatic remedies have been exhausted, and delay would irreversibly worsen the strategic position.

This certainly does not sanctify war, but it places it within the tragic logic of statecraft, rather than within moral mythology. To deny this logic is strategic infantilism and the declaration of moral inferiority.

Describing the war as “unprovoked” and demonizing its initiator is simply malicious propaganda.

The refusal of Western elites to acknowledge legitimate Russian security concerns, the instrumentalization of Ukraine as a forward strategic platform, and the systematic replacement of diplomacy with moral exhibitionism have created the conditions for war. Once these conditions were in place, escalation was no longer an aberration, but a structural outcome.

The tragedy of Ukraine can thus not be separated from the intellectual collapse of Europe’s post–Cold War order. Politics was stripped of philosophical seriousness; strategy was reduced to slogans, and moralising (not moral) language replaced genuine judgment. In such an environment, peace ceased to be a goal and became a rhetorical ornament.

This failure also explains why current peace proposals remain so implausible. Plans built around militarization, buffer zones, or permanent foreign troop deployments repeat the very logic that produced the war, promising stability through force while ignoring the underlying causes for insecurity.

History teaches a different lesson as outlined in the previous blog of 01/09/2025. In 1955, Austria regained sovereignty not through alignment, but through neutrality. By renouncing bloc politics, Austria transformed itself from a strategic object into a stabilizing subject. Neutrality was not weakness, but strategic intelligence grounded in restraint.

Applied to Ukraine, the logic is straightforward and highly relevant: a neutral Ukraine—outside NATO, free of foreign troops, and committed to peaceful coexistence—would remove the core driver of the conflict. Militarization should not and cannot secure sovereignty where predictability and restraint can.

The deeper lesson, however, goes beyond Ukraine. The war exposes what happens when politics loses its transcendental grounding—when duty, dignity, and moral responsibility are replaced by utility, ideology, and moralising posturing. In such a world, power is mistaken for principle, and destruction is justified as virtue.

All of this I’ve addressed in the Philosophy&Strategy video series on YouTube. I provide the links below. The forthcoming videos in this series will tackle the following three steps whose illumination is indispensable for peace in Ukraine: first, the epistemological error of attributing false causalities; second, the strategic misreading of aggression and responsibility; and third, the conditions of a sustainable peace rooted in neutrality rather than militarization.

YouTube Videos:

Idealistic Realism: Grand Theories of the 1990s: https://youtu.be/aXtt7QJBU2E

From Kant to Crisis: The Forgotten Foundation of Political Reason: https://youtu.be/1HCz7D-bhOM

The Brzezinski Curse: From the Grand Chessboard to the Ukraine War: https://youtu.be/uQp5Dq5iaNk

The Revival of Mises:Transcendental Economics in a Changing World: https://youtu.be/sRd71gDxELk

The Only Path to Peace in Ukraine: Neutrality, Not Militarization!

Already three years ago, in my blog essay of February 23, 2022, entitled “The Responsibility for this War in Ukraine is on the West's Side” (https://www.edwinseditorial.com/2022/02/russian-statesmanship-against-ukraine.html), I argued that President Volodymyr Zelensky should have taken a lesson from Austria in 1955. When Austria regained full sovereignty after ten years of Allied occupation, it did so not by aligning with one bloc against another, but by promising to declare itself—once national sovereignty has been established—permanently neutral under International Law. That singular act—born of prudence rather than pride—enabled Austria to secure peace, prosperity, and exert an honored role as mediator between East and West throughout the Cold War.

Ukraine could have chosen a similar path. By declaring itself neutral—not necessarily according to International Law, just as a political declaration for future national strategic orientation—Kiev could have preserved peace, avoided devastation, and positioned itself as a bridge for cooperation and commerce rather than a battleground for weakening Russia. Instead, under pressure from the Biden White House, the neoconservative establishment, and Russophobic warmongers eager for contracts and profits, the dilettantish Zelensky chose confrontation. The result has been catastrophic: hundreds of thousands of Ukrainian soldiers dead, millions displaced, a ruined economy, shattered infrastructure, political opposition crushed, the Orthodox Church persecuted, and Europe dragged into the bloodiest war a generation after the Cold War’s end.

Now, after three and a half years of war, Ukraine stands on the brink of defeat. Its population is war-weary, its resources are exhausted, and its masters in Washington, Brussels, Berlin, Paris, and London scramble to save face. They continue to feed their public the myth of a coming Ukrainian victory, painting Russia as bled dry and overextended, while behind closed doors they know that they are lying and desperately search for a way out.

But what solutions do they now offer? Fantasies of a massive buffer zone in eastern Ukraine and a peacekeeping force manned by tens or hundreds of thousands of foreign troops to “protect” Ukraine from further Russian encroachments. This is sheer insanity. The same elites who failed Europe and betrayed Ukraine before the war are repeating their errors now in fantasies for peace arrangements. They pretend that stability lies in endless militarization—when in fact the very opposite is true.

My recommendation has not changed since February 2022 and it would now be even more important to implement: the Austrian archetype would still be the best model. If Ukraine declares itself neutral—outside of NATO, committed to peaceful coexistence—no foreign “peacekeepers” would be required. No Article 5-type guarantees, no restoration of a bloated NATO-style army rebuilt in a hollowed-out society, no endless arms shipments to an exhausted nation. Neutrality would suffice for credible assurance of peace.

To suggest otherwise and regurgitate the untrue assumptions of late—to insinuate that Russia is bent on occupying Kiev, subjugating all of Ukraine, and marching across Europe in some neoimperialist campaign—is as false now as it was in 2022. Russia’s “Special Military Operation” was not an imperialist war of aggression. It was, as I argued then and repeat now, a strategic necessity forced upon Moscow after every diplomatic overture was rejected and every legitimate Russian security concern mocked. Without the West’s refusal to engage in serious and meaningful dialogue, there would have been no war.

A just postwar settlement must therefore rest on simple realities. First, the territories now under Russian control in the east and south will remain under Russian control, unless and until a neutral government in Kiev emerges that can be trusted to deal in good faith with both West and East. Second, no foreign troops—NATO or otherwise—should be stationed in Ukraine. Third, Ukraine’s sovereignty must be preserved not by militarization but by renunciation of bloc politics. All of this, if need be, replenished by a non-attack treaty signed between NATO and Russia.

This also would require political renewal inside Ukraine. A government of neutrality and reconciliation could not be led by men such as Zelensky or Poroshenko, whose politics have been defined by hatred for Russia and subservience to Western dictates. Nor can it be founded on the suppression of religion and opposition parties or eradicating Russian language and culture in the oblasts in the east and south of Ukraine. Ukraine’s rebirth requires leadership capable of elevating itself beyond the animosities that poisoned the post-Maidan years. In this sense, even the restoration of President Yanukovych as an interim caretaker could be envisaged, until genuine elections are possible under conditions of stability and inclusion.

This will be controversial to Western ears, which have been deaf to factual reasoning for much too long. But one must remember: Ukraine is not an enemy of Russia. It is the cradle of Russian identity, a Slavic sister nation. Putin has never sought its eradication, only its refusal to be weaponized against Moscow by foreign powers. Once Washington and Brussels acknowledge this, peace becomes possible.

The larger question is whether Western leaders are capable of recovering their senses—intellectually, morally, and strategically. Can the neocons beleaguering  the White House and its chorus in European capitals, abandon their delusions of military triumph and accept neutrality as the only workable foundation of peace? Can they finally give peace, rather than perpetual mobilization and war faring, a chance?

This is not just about Ukraine. It is about Europe’s survival. The post–Cold War opportunities for peace were squandered by arrogance and blindness. But history may yet offer a second chance—if Europe has the courage to seize it.

If only this essay could reach Donald Trump himself—or at least one of his close advisors, like Secretary of State Marco Rubio! The time has come for a statesman to break with the disastrous course charted by neoconservatives and their European imitators. Neutrality, not militarization, is the only path forward—for Ukraine, for Europe, and for the West.

Alaska Summit: President Trump Is Setting Himself Up for Failure! No Peace Without Ending Zelensky’s Destructive Role and Changing the EU’s Flawed Stance

For years, I have argued in multiple blog entries—against the prevailing orthodoxy—that the true culprits behind the armed conflict in Ukraine were not to be found in Moscow, but in Washington, Brussels, and Kyiv. Western policy in Ukraine was a reckless, immoral gamble—driven not by the defense of democracy, but by a blind Russophobia and geopolitical vanity of Washington, Brussels, and their willing proxy in Kyiv. In those same essays, I also explained why the Russian Special Military Operation—routinely dismissed by the uninformed and ideologically blinded as a “war of aggression” (confusing militarily offensive with politically defensive)—was justifiable on moral grounds.

This point matters, because in our legal-positivist era, morality is often forgotten. Yet moral law—the ethical righteousness of human acts—precedes legal provisions. In the end and ultimately: Morality beats legality. Specifically in international relations! But for those unwilling to accept anything beyond legal norms, Russia’s campaign could also be justified under Article 51 of the UN Charter, which allows for collective self-defense—a principle applicable in light of the injustices committed by Kyiv against the eastern oblasts and their Russian populations since the Western-backed color revolution of 2014.

Ukraine leadership, backed by signatory states like Germany and France, failed to implement the Minsk I and II agreements. As a result, Russia acted to end the intolerable conditions suffered by large portions of the population and to rectify the wrongs inflicted since post-Maidan Ukraine first came under an American proxy president, Petro Poroshenko. This policy of repression was then intensified under Zelensky, whose bid to join NATO—and thereby place the alliance’s military reach directly on Russia’s border—combined with a massive rearmament program, left no doubt that Ukraine was ready to serve as a U.S. proxy for weakening Russia, even to the point of seeking regime change in Moscow.

As I wrote in my blog essay of December 18, 2022 (to be found in totality here):

“Preemptive war can be justified when all peaceful means and all alternatives to using force have been exhausted and only immediate military action can prevent higher threats from materializing.”

I do not repeat my arguments—very much in contrast to American and European warmongers—out of pride, pigheadedness, or the inability to revise my views when confronted with historical reality. The latter has meanwhile corroborated the appropriateness of my arguments. Unfortunately, intellectual flexibility is entirely absent among the decision-makers in the European Commission, NATO, and the Ukrainian government. They stubbornly cling to the very policies and flawed judgments that ignited the war in the first place.

Now, as President Trump prepares to meet President Putin in Alaska this Friday for historic peace talks—talks already boycotted by both Zelensky and the EU—another of my earlier warnings stands vindicated. In my March 5, 2024, post, I wrote (find the whole essay here):

“To end the war, the Zelensky regime—described by some as fascist—must be ousted. Ukraine should be divided, with the conquered territories temporarily under Russian control, and a new government should be established in Kyiv. This government must be able to cooperate with both East and West and should commit to refraining from joining NATO or engaging in any form of military cooperation with the U.S. and its allies.”

If peace is to be achieved, Zelensky must go. His continued presence in power guarantees only the prolongation of conflict, needless bloodshed, and further devastation for Ukraine. U.S. and EU support should have ended long ago; instead, the relentless flow of arms and funds has merely deepened the tragedy.

It is incomprehensible that President Trump failed to act decisively when Zelensky stirred discord in the Oval Office on February 28, 2025. He was allowed to leave Washington unscathed, returning to Kyiv to continue his ruinous course. The US is not a member to the International Criminal Court, but I am sure the legal experts in the US State Department could have found a paragraph justifying detaining the usurper and war criminal Zelensky. That was a missed opportunity to remove a central obstacle to peace.

With the Alaska talks imminent, the question now is how Trump and Putin can overcome the obstructionism of Zelensky and his European backers and achieve a settlement that is both just and durable. Such an agreement must, as I have long maintained, include territorial recognition for Russia in the east and south—regions subjected to repression, discrimination, political marginalization, and military assault since 2014. Any peace plan that ignores this reality—as European leaders seem to be committed to do—is doomed to fail.

Let us once again state the obvious: First Obama and then Biden and the American national security elites—not Putin—bear primary responsibility for this confrontation between Russia and the West. Unless the U.S. neoconservatives, the European Commission, and NATO’s senior leadership awaken from their Russophobe slumber and abandon their imperial dreams of global dominance, any armistice will be temporary, and future conflict inevitable.

The decisive challenge is to reintroduce philosophical depth into the thinking of those advising both President Trump and Europe’s leaders. Trump’s instincts are, as so often, correct—anchored in conservative-Christian principles and oriented toward fair, mutually beneficial outcomes. Yet his inner circle remains mired in Cold War thinking, granting humanity and legitimate interests to allies while denying them to perceived adversaries.

Here, Mr. Putin could serve as an example: a statesman of intellect and moral clarity whose consistent positions—from his February 10, 2007, Munich Security Conference speech to countless press conferences with world journalists since—have been deliberately distorted by Western politicians and media, who project onto him the cynicism that truly resides in their own policies.

The hope now is that Presidents Trump and Putin can reach an agreement that serves Ukraine, Europe, and the wider world. The support of Zelensky and his morally bankrupt backers in Brussels will not be needed—and indeed, would only imperil any chance of lasting peace. How these forces can be neutralized so they do not sabotage a potential settlement may require nothing less than a statesmanlike miracle at the Alaska Summit.

What Happened to Trump? Disillusionment, Ukraine, and the Return of the Deep State

I remember a time when President Trump seemed to embody a long-awaited political corrective—a repudiation of America’s imperial overreach, a purge of the entrenched bureaucracy of the deep state, and the promise to restore sanity in national security and foreign affairs. But that promise is rapidly fading.

His recent decision to bomb Iranian nuclear sites—just three days before the expiration of a negotiation window—already raised alarms. But the current decision to resume arms deliveries to Ukraine reeks of strategic confusion. Quite obviously, the warmongering neocons and deep-state operatives tied to the military-industrial complex have outmaneuvered the president, confirming a suspicion long in the making: the deep state is not only alive but thriving. The very machinery President Trump once vowed to dismantle appears to have prevailed over him.

Let me be clear once again and say this to political advisors on both sides of the Atlantic: the political elites of international affairs and security in the US and the EU have placed themselves, from the very beginning of the Ukraine conflict, on the wrong side of history. The war could have easily been prevented.

I have meticulously detailed the origins of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict—most notably in this very blog, in entries since before the outbreak of the war in 2022. From the outset, I argued that the root cause was not Russian imperialism, but the West’s refusal to recognize Russia’s legitimate security concerns. NATO’s relentless eastward expansion, the betrayal of promises once made to the contrary, and the refusal to grant Ukraine neutral status were all ingredients in a recipe for war. Ukraine could have served as a bridge between East and West. Instead, it was converted into a proxy for a delusional confrontation—one orchestrated by American neoconservatives and executed by an ideologically compromised, corruption-prone Ukrainian leadership.

Mr. Trump seemed to know all of this. His initial rhetoric rightly identified NATO as obsolete, the EU as bureaucratically overreaching, and Ukraine’s role in the conflict as problematic. His claim that, had he been president in 2022, the war would not have happened bears truth. In his first term, he signaled clearly that he intended to cooperate with Russia and respect its national security concerns.

But what are we to make of his latest decision—resuming weapons deliveries to Kyiv, implicitly blaming Putin while giving Zelenskyy a free pass, and backtracking on what was once a principled rejection of globalist interventionism?

One can only hope that this does not mark the collapse of Mr. Trump’s America First doctrine. His policy shift bears the signs of a betrayal of his own strategic project—which was never about isolationism but about prioritizing national interest and strategic restraint. Yet by supporting the extension of a war that, by his own account, would never have occurred under his presidency, he now legitimizes the very structures he once challenged.

President Trump—once an opponent of ideological dogmatism—now joins the chorus of moralizers in the European Union, most notably in Germany, France, and Great Britain, who refuse to face geopolitical reality.

Even now, in the fourth year of this tragic conflict, the West’s political elites have failed to learn their lessons. Instead of critical reflection, they double down on failed policies and reject the application of long-established theoretical frameworks in international relations. They ignore the philosophical underpinnings required to understand global affairs. They dismiss, for instance, the insights of thinkers like Francis Fukuyama, whose central warning—the need for recognition in global relations—remains as relevant as ever. It is precisely the failure to recognize Russia’s demand for dignity, its civilizational space, and its strategic red lines that led to war.

For now, the neoconservatives and other war hawks have won. They have reasserted their control over foreign policy by outlasting Mr. Trump’s initially meaningful stance. They are exploiting a moment of crisis—the Russians have intensified their military advance, and the war is clearly lost for Ukraine—to reinstall their failed doctrines. It is quite disheartening that Mr. Trump would fall prey to their pressure and allow himself to be talked into such an intellectually dishonest and historically tragic course. He is not aware—and nobody in his administration seems to explain to him—that the planned resumption of weapons delivery will only prolong an already lost war, increase the casualty rate, and cost further meaningless loss of human lives, territory, and treasure. 

The president demonstrated throughout his first term that he understood the conceptual tragedy of America’s post–Cold War strategic design. He took promising steps to reverse it, returning to a more principled and philosophically grounded posture—one that drew inspiration from the restraint of the Monroe Doctrine.

As I’ve written repeatedly on www.edwinseditorial.com and elsewhere, including in my political-philosophical study 44 & 45. The Tenures of US Presidents Barack Obama and Donald Trump, the proper orientation of international relations demands a return to foundational insights of political theory: sovereignty, recognition, the minimum standards of international law, an ethics of foreign policy, and respect for civilizational diversity. These would be the prerequisites for peace.

Trump once seemed to intuitively grasp all this. That he has now forgotten—or forsaken—it is cause for serious concern.