When back in the days of President Jimmy Carter, the U.S. gave North Korea technology for nuclear reactors and a few billion bucks on top of it, only gullible liberals believed that the regime would use atomic capability only for peaceful purposes.
Every serious scholar and student of international relations, then as well as today, knows that nuclear armament – even when it’s only a few warheads – is the big equalizer in terms of national security. It balances out any inferiority in terms of conventional armed forces, size of the country, demographics, and economic capacity. During the roughly forty years of the Cold War, it was the paradox of nuclear deterrence and the so aptly abbreviated (MAD) Mutually Assured Destruction that prevented any severe conventional wars from breaking out. The likelihood of any conflict escalating to the level of nuclear warfare reduced the chances for a conventional war on a larger scale.
Given the historically burdened ideological antagonism toward the West, it was to expect that North Korea would strive to become a nuclear power at all cost – even at the expense of lying to treaty partners and the international community and making pledges it never intended to keep. After all the leniency and unsuccessful attempts at appeasement under Carter in the 1970ies, Clinton in the 1990ies, and the do-nothing strategy of so-called strategic patience under Obama, it is now too late to prevent North Korea from becoming a nuclear power, albeit it a minor one.
It appears that we have somehow returned to the conditions that dominated a particular dimension of international relations during the Cold War, which means the hysteria on the part of the Strategic Community in the U.S. is unwarranted – and so is President Trump’s martial rhetoric.
Against the backdrop of the U.S.’ unmatched military means in terms of global power projection and nuclear capabilities, I propose a two-tier solution to resolve the conflict with North Korea. These measures would allow avoiding further escalation and avert unnecessary distress for international relations and potentially affected populations:
1. The stratagem of ‘Deterrence by Denial’ has to be applied by implementing all capabilities for missile defense and interception on the Korean peninsula and all other potential target areas for North Korean ballistic missiles, be it the west coast of the U.S., Guam, or other regions and locales. These aggressive military steps have to join hands with civil defense measures for the protection of populations and vital military and civilian infrastructure that help minimize any damage in the unlikely event of being impacted by the use of weapons of mass destruction.
2. The promise of ‘Annihilation upon 1st Strike’ has to be plausibly and assuredly threatened to the regime in North Korea. The U.S. must unmistakably convey through diplomatic channels and public discourse that it does not intend to use nuclear weapons against North Korea first. However, it will annihilate North Korea if North Korea uses nuclear weapons against the U.S. or any of its allies. Despite its seemingly irrational rhetoric, the regime of Kim Jong Un will not invite destruction upon themselves and their country.
There is no need for preemptive strikes to take out North Korean weaponry or delivery systems. The cost in human lives would be too high, total success uncertain, and retaliation most probable. If it comes to this, the U.S. and the rest of the world would be able to live with the fact that North Korea and its autocratic regime avail over some nuclear armament and feel powerful and on level par with other nuclear-armed nations around the world. However, like all the others, it will be condemned never to use them unless they want to bring Armageddon over their people.
While implementing this strategy and defusing the danger of thermonuclear, all diplomatic and other means of conflict resolution and appeasement can and should be used to keep the radical North Korean regime in check and further neutralize the threat.
Dealing with North Korea in the proposed way should usher the United States into a long-overdue new era of measured foreign affairs and national security policy that relinquishes the overly self-centered geostrategic arrogance and hubris of the past two decades.
Every serious scholar and student of international relations, then as well as today, knows that nuclear armament – even when it’s only a few warheads – is the big equalizer in terms of national security. It balances out any inferiority in terms of conventional armed forces, size of the country, demographics, and economic capacity. During the roughly forty years of the Cold War, it was the paradox of nuclear deterrence and the so aptly abbreviated (MAD) Mutually Assured Destruction that prevented any severe conventional wars from breaking out. The likelihood of any conflict escalating to the level of nuclear warfare reduced the chances for a conventional war on a larger scale.
Given the historically burdened ideological antagonism toward the West, it was to expect that North Korea would strive to become a nuclear power at all cost – even at the expense of lying to treaty partners and the international community and making pledges it never intended to keep. After all the leniency and unsuccessful attempts at appeasement under Carter in the 1970ies, Clinton in the 1990ies, and the do-nothing strategy of so-called strategic patience under Obama, it is now too late to prevent North Korea from becoming a nuclear power, albeit it a minor one.
It appears that we have somehow returned to the conditions that dominated a particular dimension of international relations during the Cold War, which means the hysteria on the part of the Strategic Community in the U.S. is unwarranted – and so is President Trump’s martial rhetoric.
Against the backdrop of the U.S.’ unmatched military means in terms of global power projection and nuclear capabilities, I propose a two-tier solution to resolve the conflict with North Korea. These measures would allow avoiding further escalation and avert unnecessary distress for international relations and potentially affected populations:
1. The stratagem of ‘Deterrence by Denial’ has to be applied by implementing all capabilities for missile defense and interception on the Korean peninsula and all other potential target areas for North Korean ballistic missiles, be it the west coast of the U.S., Guam, or other regions and locales. These aggressive military steps have to join hands with civil defense measures for the protection of populations and vital military and civilian infrastructure that help minimize any damage in the unlikely event of being impacted by the use of weapons of mass destruction.
2. The promise of ‘Annihilation upon 1st Strike’ has to be plausibly and assuredly threatened to the regime in North Korea. The U.S. must unmistakably convey through diplomatic channels and public discourse that it does not intend to use nuclear weapons against North Korea first. However, it will annihilate North Korea if North Korea uses nuclear weapons against the U.S. or any of its allies. Despite its seemingly irrational rhetoric, the regime of Kim Jong Un will not invite destruction upon themselves and their country.
There is no need for preemptive strikes to take out North Korean weaponry or delivery systems. The cost in human lives would be too high, total success uncertain, and retaliation most probable. If it comes to this, the U.S. and the rest of the world would be able to live with the fact that North Korea and its autocratic regime avail over some nuclear armament and feel powerful and on level par with other nuclear-armed nations around the world. However, like all the others, it will be condemned never to use them unless they want to bring Armageddon over their people.
While implementing this strategy and defusing the danger of thermonuclear, all diplomatic and other means of conflict resolution and appeasement can and should be used to keep the radical North Korean regime in check and further neutralize the threat.
Dealing with North Korea in the proposed way should usher the United States into a long-overdue new era of measured foreign affairs and national security policy that relinquishes the overly self-centered geostrategic arrogance and hubris of the past two decades.
