War is always ugly but sometimes inevitable. Neither its justification nor condemnation should be decided from the gut!

Being against violence does not make for a beautiful soul (Aristotle)

If we consider war as a continuation of political activity by other means, it never arises out of nowhere. Every war has a history that led to it. The topic of war is complex and delicate, and assessing its justification or inevitability in specific instances is even more so.

The general public often views war as the worst of all evils. The prevailing opinion is that the side that starts a war is inherently wrong and evil, while the side that resists is right and good. But as history and rational reflection show us, this is not necessarily true. If it were so easy to distinguish between right and wrong in war, many instances would reveal the United States and its Western allies as the aggressors. If the question of war could be answered based purely on emotion, we would never need to discuss the "Just War" theory, which has occupied philosophers from Augustine and Thomas Aquinas to Michael Walzer and others, including myself. I devoted my doctoral thesis (and the book based on it) to the morality and immorality of violence (and non-violence) on both individual, collective, and politico-military levels.

The evaluation of war and its political-ethical implications can be approached from two essential perspectives. First, what triggered the war, and what prompted political leaders or governing bodies to go to war? What is the causa iusta—the just reason, as the primary consideration of the principle of ius ad bellum (right to war)—that justifies or seems to justify waging war?

The challenge in assessing this crucial aspect is that the justification for the use of force—no matter when it occurs—is always subjective, based on the intentions of political leaders or decision-making bodies. To assess this adequately, observers—whether individuals, political administrations, or international bodies—must rise to a meta-level of thought, striving to judge the events leading to the dispute as objectively and impartially as possible. Unfortunately, this rarely happens, as pacifist and political-ideological emotions often cloud judgment. The United Nations, which should ideally play this role, seldom succeeds in maintaining this objective and impartial perspective.

Two essential criteria of transcendental moral philosophy (independent of experience and comprehensible by reason alone) for ius ad bellum are necessity and inevitability. War must always be a last resort, necessary and inevitable as the only option for resolving a conflict. While this is relatively obvious in cases of clear defense, it becomes more complicated in cases of preemption or prevention. A pre-emptive war represents a proactive breach of the peace, aimed at addressing an imminent threat or gaining a strategic advantage before an inevitable armed conflict. Pre-emptive war may be justified if all alternatives to the use of force have been exhausted, or if immediate military intervention is needed to prevent a much larger threat. Examples of pre-emptive military strikes include Israel's Six-Day War in 1967 and the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. In the latter case, the assumption that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) was used as a justification for war, though this proved to be inaccurate.

The ius in bello (law in war) is the second aspect of warfare to be evaluated. Do the warring parties and their military forces abide by the laws of war, such as the Geneva Conventions? Do they wage wars based on universal human principles that must not be endangered or abandoned, even in armed conflict? Do the warring parties distinguish between combatants and non-combatants? Are military targets the focus, with efforts made to minimize collateral damage? Are prisoners of war and wounded enemy soldiers treated in accordance with the Geneva Protocols, and are war crimes avoided?

While both sides appear to violate the ius in bello in the ongoing Ukraine war, only alleged Russian war crimes are widely reported in the West. For example, there is no mention of Ukrainian troops using civilians as human shields, choosing defensive positions in residential areas, or arming non-combatants in violation of martial law, actions that organized crime exploits to wreak havoc, while the blame is shifted to Russian forces. Furthermore, there is no mention of the restraint Putin has imposed on his armed forces, with a focus on military objectives. The West misinterprets this as incompetence on the part of Russian troops.

To understand the causalities that led to the war and provide criteria for its potential resolution, we must focus on the question of ius ad bellum—the reasons and motives for starting a war that lie within the hands of political leaders.

As discussed in my previous blog, the situation that led Russia to resort to military force arose from the uncompromising stance of Western political decision-makers. Apart from Ukraine's repeated provocations in the Russian-friendly regions of Donbas and Luhansk, the continued disregard for Russia's legitimate security interests, and Ukraine's insistence on pursuing full NATO membership, led to the war. From Putin's perspective, the decision to go to war was justified—whether or not the West agrees. For him, it was about protecting Russia’s security interests, and he didn’t take this decision lightly.

Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's role in the escalation is also significant. In complete disregard of security policy contexts, he pushed his country’s national self-determination far beyond a sensible security strategy. Ignoring geopolitical realities, historical ties, and Russia’s security concerns, he pushed for NATO membership, even suggesting that Ukraine should adopt nuclear weapons.

Zelensky neglected timeless principles of national security, disregarding the need to balance national goals with the security interests of neighboring countries. He failed to consider NATO's eastward expansion, which, over the past three decades since the Cold War, has brought the alliance ever closer to Russia's borders. His stance on NATO membership, and even potential nuclear armament, provoked Russia.

From Russia’s point of view, the war became inevitable. Putin exhausted all non-violent options for conflict resolution. He never wanted war, but the West’s Russophobic political elites gave him no other choice. Could he have waited or refrained from action? Yes, but Western leaders were equally responsible for the escalation, hoping he would eventually concede. In that context, Russia’s military action met the criteria of necessity and inevitability.

The events leading up to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, including Zelensky’s naive actions, have been addressed in previous blog posts. On the day Russia initiated its military operation, I wrote how easily the political elites of the West could have prevented this war and why they bear responsibility for it.

From the perspective of future generations, it will be a shameful chapter in political history that highly paid security experts, national security advisers, and warmongering politicians failed—and, indeed, refused—to prevent Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is astonishing how politicians and media commentators continue to condemn Putin while ignoring their own role in the conflict.

Now that the war is underway, the Western political elites are doubling down on their stance, escalating matters further. A few voices in the U.S. and Europe, such as Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard and Fox News' Tucker Carlson, who offer more objective analysis, are labeled as traitors. Europe, too, suffers from thought policing, where any deviation from the mainstream narrative can result in serious consequences. The democracies we once prided ourselves on are making a mockery of themselves.

In conclusion, the war is entirely pointless and could have easily been avoided. The Ukrainians, led by their naive and megalomaniacal president, have waged an unnecessary war. Through their arrogance and submission to Western influence, they have devastated their own country. It’s now clear that Washington, Berlin, and Kiev must offer Putin what they should have before the conflict began—if there is any hope of ending it.

This situation mirrors the events of August 1914, when a localized dispute between Austria and Serbia escalated into World War I. We must not allow the Russian-Ukrainian conflict to spiral into World War III.

Russophobia - Achilles’ Heel of US-Russia Relations

The demonizing of Russia and specifically of Vladimir Putin has been profoundly regretful and damaging to global affairs in recent years. It appears the U.S. could not rise above the old animosity vis-à-vis the follower nation to the Soviet Union that dominated bi-polar relations during the Cold War. In the quarter-century since, the United States, in its leading role in NATO and cooperation with the European Union, has pursued interventionist policies. Those aimed at global predominance and strengthening its position as the sole remaining superpower.

The U.S. and its partners wasted the opportunities to establish a righteous new world order the post-Cold War security environment offered. As I've made clear in my blog entries over the past years, geopolitical misconceptions paired with strategic hubris and ideological delusions as rampant in the White House and the State Department regimes led to utterly folly in foreign affairs international relations. Besides the undermining and destruction of nation-state structures in the Middle East and the intentional armed support of extremists and insurgents, color revolutions have been backed by the U.S. and E.U., for example, in Georgia and Ukraine. Central to the failed policies was the stunning neglect of legitimate national and strategic interests of other players in international relations.

The latter fact became painfully visible in the wake of the regime change in Ukraine. Every reasonably informed scholar of strategic and security studies could have foreseen the control of Crimea and eastern Ukraine's support by Russia. The installation of a puppet regime in Kiev by Washington and Berlin was unacceptable to Russia after the U.S. had pushed toward her borders through aggressive NATO expansion. To drive Russia out of its Black Sea ports and potentially prepare full-fledged membership of Ukraine, as the geostrategic 'Near Abroad,' in NATO would be intolerable for Russia. The blatant disregard of legitimate Russian interests went along with the infamy of blaming Russia for imperialism that had been clearly and unashamedly pushed by the U.S. and the transatlantic alliance.

It is impossible to accurately verify the degree to which strategic ignorance, national hubris, indifferent imperialism, pseudo-democratic universalism, or apparent economic interest and pressure from the military-industrial complex have led to the failed policy design. Yet, the miserable Pax Americana attempted in the last quarter-century was certainly a conglomerate of all these and probably more factors. In conjunction with Putin's demonization and the artificial preservation of Russia as the primary geopolitical enemy, western powers set the course for missing out on establishing a functioning global post-Cold War world order, including meaningful collaboration for containment of radical Islam. The outrageous claim of the Democratic Party that Russian hacking and cyber intervention lost the election for Hillary Clinton –probably one of the biggest scams in politics ever suggested– further exacerbated the relations with Russia. Mr. Obama's decision to expatriate Russian diplomats and impose additional sanctions under the pretense of Russia's alleged interference in the U.S. presidential elections will rank prominently among the many political follies this man has perpetrated.

The new administration under President Donald Trump, which alone gave hope to conquer the old resentments toward Russia and alleviate the damage the previous administration had caused, appears to be succumbing to the Russophobe and Putin-hating pressure forces in the U.S. Senate, the U.S. Congress, and the media. The new U.S. Ambassador's aggressive speech to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, and the ousting of security advisor General Flynn based on informal conversations with the Russian ambassador provides sad testimony to that assessment.  

Overcoming the hysteria vis-à-vis Russia and its leader Vladimir Putin has to be considered the number one priority in U.S. foreign affairs. Maintaining Russia artificially as an enemy image for a new Cold War and conventional arms race must be ended. A mindful and critical, yet simultaneously constructive and respectful relationship with Russia from the part of the United States is long overdue, for whose materialization the numerous challenges to international relations and global security offer ample opportunity. Russia has to be part of fighting the Islamic State and radical Islamism worldwide and has to play a role in stabilizing the Middle East. While mutually respecting legitimate national interests, a balance of power should result in the pursuance of common objectives and joint ends in global affairs.

But this might require prominent representatives of society and state in the U.S. to stop calling Mr. Putin a murderer, abandoning the sanctions regime, and acknowledging Russia's legitimate strategic and economic interests concerning the Caucasus, Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. It will also necessitate the easing up of U.S. and NATO forces' aggressive posture in the Baltic States and Eastern Europe.

The new administration must not continue the insanity of the Obama years. The step from considering Russia as a geopolitical enemy toward Russia as a geostrategic counterpart and potential collaborator in global affairs must take place now. In light of Western Christian societies' Islamic subversion, this appears to be a strategic necessity and social obligation.