Being against violence does not make for a beautiful soul (Aristotle)
If we consider war as a continuation of political activity by other means, it never arises out of nowhere. Every war has a history that led to it. The topic of war is complex and delicate, and assessing its justification or inevitability in specific instances is even more so.
The general public often views war as the worst of all evils. The prevailing opinion is that the side that starts a war is inherently wrong and evil, while the side that resists is right and good. But as history and rational reflection show us, this is not necessarily true. If it were so easy to distinguish between right and wrong in war, many instances would reveal the United States and its Western allies as the aggressors. If the question of war could be answered based purely on emotion, we would never need to discuss the "Just War" theory, which has occupied philosophers from Augustine and Thomas Aquinas to Michael Walzer and others, including myself. I devoted my doctoral thesis (and the book based on it) to the morality and immorality of violence (and non-violence) on both individual, collective, and politico-military levels.
The evaluation of war and its political-ethical implications can be approached from two essential perspectives. First, what triggered the war, and what prompted political leaders or governing bodies to go to war? What is the causa iusta—the just reason, as the primary consideration of the principle of ius ad bellum (right to war)—that justifies or seems to justify waging war?
The challenge in assessing this crucial aspect is that the justification for the use of force—no matter when it occurs—is always subjective, based on the intentions of political leaders or decision-making bodies. To assess this adequately, observers—whether individuals, political administrations, or international bodies—must rise to a meta-level of thought, striving to judge the events leading to the dispute as objectively and impartially as possible. Unfortunately, this rarely happens, as pacifist and political-ideological emotions often cloud judgment. The United Nations, which should ideally play this role, seldom succeeds in maintaining this objective and impartial perspective.
Two essential criteria of transcendental moral philosophy (independent of experience and comprehensible by reason alone) for ius ad bellum are necessity and inevitability. War must always be a last resort, necessary and inevitable as the only option for resolving a conflict. While this is relatively obvious in cases of clear defense, it becomes more complicated in cases of preemption or prevention. A pre-emptive war represents a proactive breach of the peace, aimed at addressing an imminent threat or gaining a strategic advantage before an inevitable armed conflict. Pre-emptive war may be justified if all alternatives to the use of force have been exhausted, or if immediate military intervention is needed to prevent a much larger threat. Examples of pre-emptive military strikes include Israel's Six-Day War in 1967 and the 2003 U.S. invasion of Iraq. In the latter case, the assumption that Saddam Hussein had weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) was used as a justification for war, though this proved to be inaccurate.
The ius in bello (law in war) is the second aspect of warfare to be evaluated. Do the warring parties and their military forces abide by the laws of war, such as the Geneva Conventions? Do they wage wars based on universal human principles that must not be endangered or abandoned, even in armed conflict? Do the warring parties distinguish between combatants and non-combatants? Are military targets the focus, with efforts made to minimize collateral damage? Are prisoners of war and wounded enemy soldiers treated in accordance with the Geneva Protocols, and are war crimes avoided?
While both sides appear to violate the ius in bello in the ongoing Ukraine war, only alleged Russian war crimes are widely reported in the West. For example, there is no mention of Ukrainian troops using civilians as human shields, choosing defensive positions in residential areas, or arming non-combatants in violation of martial law, actions that organized crime exploits to wreak havoc, while the blame is shifted to Russian forces. Furthermore, there is no mention of the restraint Putin has imposed on his armed forces, with a focus on military objectives. The West misinterprets this as incompetence on the part of Russian troops.
To understand the causalities that led to the war and provide criteria for its potential resolution, we must focus on the question of ius ad bellum—the reasons and motives for starting a war that lie within the hands of political leaders.
As discussed in my previous blog, the situation that led Russia to resort to military force arose from the uncompromising stance of Western political decision-makers. Apart from Ukraine's repeated provocations in the Russian-friendly regions of Donbas and Luhansk, the continued disregard for Russia's legitimate security interests, and Ukraine's insistence on pursuing full NATO membership, led to the war. From Putin's perspective, the decision to go to war was justified—whether or not the West agrees. For him, it was about protecting Russia’s security interests, and he didn’t take this decision lightly.
Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky's role in the escalation is also significant. In complete disregard of security policy contexts, he pushed his country’s national self-determination far beyond a sensible security strategy. Ignoring geopolitical realities, historical ties, and Russia’s security concerns, he pushed for NATO membership, even suggesting that Ukraine should adopt nuclear weapons.
Zelensky neglected timeless principles of national security, disregarding the need to balance national goals with the security interests of neighboring countries. He failed to consider NATO's eastward expansion, which, over the past three decades since the Cold War, has brought the alliance ever closer to Russia's borders. His stance on NATO membership, and even potential nuclear armament, provoked Russia.
From Russia’s point of view, the war became inevitable. Putin exhausted all non-violent options for conflict resolution. He never wanted war, but the West’s Russophobic political elites gave him no other choice. Could he have waited or refrained from action? Yes, but Western leaders were equally responsible for the escalation, hoping he would eventually concede. In that context, Russia’s military action met the criteria of necessity and inevitability.
The events leading up to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, including Zelensky’s naive actions, have been addressed in previous blog posts. On the day Russia initiated its military operation, I wrote how easily the political elites of the West could have prevented this war and why they bear responsibility for it.
From the perspective of future generations, it will be a shameful chapter in political history that highly paid security experts, national security advisers, and warmongering politicians failed—and, indeed, refused—to prevent Russia’s invasion of Ukraine. It is astonishing how politicians and media commentators continue to condemn Putin while ignoring their own role in the conflict.
Now that the war is underway, the Western political elites are doubling down on their stance, escalating matters further. A few voices in the U.S. and Europe, such as Congresswoman Tulsi Gabbard and Fox News' Tucker Carlson, who offer more objective analysis, are labeled as traitors. Europe, too, suffers from thought policing, where any deviation from the mainstream narrative can result in serious consequences. The democracies we once prided ourselves on are making a mockery of themselves.
In conclusion, the war is entirely pointless and could have easily been avoided. The Ukrainians, led by their naive and megalomaniacal president, have waged an unnecessary war. Through their arrogance and submission to Western influence, they have devastated their own country. It’s now clear that Washington, Berlin, and Kiev must offer Putin what they should have before the conflict began—if there is any hope of ending it.
This situation mirrors the events of August 1914, when a localized dispute between Austria and Serbia escalated into World War I. We must not allow the Russian-Ukrainian conflict to spiral into World War III.
