The Ukraine-Russia War and the Recovery of Strategic Judgment As Precondition for Peace

This essay draws from my Ukraine Trilogy publish ed in the form of three videos on my YouTube Channel  @edstakephil. Here is the link to the YouTube Short that connects to the trilogy for further reference Ukraine Trilogy Short 

The tragedy of Ukraine raises a question that extends beyond military operations: what happens when political leaders lose the capacity to distinguish moral conviction from sound strategic judgment? My trilogy on Ukraine, presented in the Philosophy & Strategy series of Ed’s Take, addresses this question through three connected arguments. First, intellectual failure prepares the ground for destructive policy. Second, inadequate explanations of war obscure responsibility and obstruct diplomacy. Third, sustainable peace requires a political transformation grounded in recognition, neutrality, and reciprocal restraint.

The trilogy proceeds from philosophical diagnosis to strategic analysis and finally to a normative framework for peace. Its central concern is the quality of thought that makes responsible statecraft possible.

The first part (Intellectual Bankruptsy) examines what I call intellectual and strategic illiteracy. Political discourse frequently explains war through the wickedness, irrationality, or imperial ambitions of adversaries. Such explanations offer emotional reassurance, but they conceal the sequence of decisions through which confrontation developed. Once one side is designated the embodiment of evil, diplomacy risks being condemned to fail before it even begins.

Nietzsche’s discussion of the confusion of cause and effect as a major flaw in human thinking provides a philosophical point of departure. In politics, and specifically in international relations, this problem manifests when a dramatic outcome of an often-times yearlong process is taken as the reason and sole cause of the process that produced it. A military attack, i.e. Russia’s military operation against Ukraine, is immediate evidence. It is easily turned on its head and interpreted as the cause of the entire conflict; the diplomatic failures, competing expectations, and accumulating fears preceding it are less visible and conveniently overlooked. This can’t withstand the scrutiny of a serious analysis.

Political judgment requires us to hold these questions together. Otherwise, moral language becomes an instrument of self-absolution, protecting policymakers from scrutiny while the dire human consequences of their policies continue.

My concern here is philosophical. When politics loses its grounding in duty, human dignity, and the obligation to exercise judgment, strategic calculation becomes detached from moral limits. The lives of individuals disappear behind abstractions such as credibility, victory, and geopolitical advantage. Recovering restraint therefore requires recovering the intellectual seriousness through which power becomes answerable to principle.

The second installment (Unprovoked??)  applies this diagnosis to Ukraine. Clausewitz’s observation that war is never an isolated act supplies the essential strategic premise: armed conflict belongs to a political history and must be understood within it. The immediate outbreak of hostilities cannot, by itself, explain the relationship that made hostilities possible.

My argument challenges the claim of Russia starting a war “unprovoked.” When that term blocks out the discussion of NATO enlargement, Ukraine’s strategic orientation, and Russia’s expressed security concerns, it substitutes a verdict for an inquiry. Understanding the conflict requires examining how the parties interpreted the changing security environment and acted on it.

The trilogy consequently approaches Crimea and the February 2022 invasion through the relationship between perceived threats and political decisions. In my interpretation, Moscow’s calculations cannot be understood without considering the strategic importance of her southern fleet's Black Sea access through Crimea and its opposition to Ukraine’s integration into Western military structures. These considerations do not automatically justify that invasion was inevitable but explain the strategic necessity from Russia’s vantage point.

This qualification matters. My criticism of Western policy concerns its contribution to an escalating confrontation and its reluctance to examine that contribution, least of all take responsibility for it. Yet, a durable settlement requires accepting accountability broad enough to identify what each party must give. An explanation that leaves every prior assumption untouched offers no guidance for preventing renewed conflict and generating a lasting peace arrangement.

The third part of the trilogy (Strategic Restraint Now) asks what follows for peace. The answer I provide is subsumed under the ,headline of “Sovereignty Through Restraint.“ Ukraine must adopt a policy of strategic neutrality, supported by reciprocal commitments from Russia and the Western alliance.

Neutrality is understood here as a sovereign political orientation rather than strict neutrality under International Law. Ukraine would exercise this strategic policy orientation by declining membership in a military alliance and refraining from becoming a forward platform for a great-power confrontation. While doing this, it would retain scope for economic exchange, diplomatic engagement, and – equally important - domestic political development. In conjunction with Strategic Restraint its geographical position could become the basis for bridging competing interests rather than fostering confrontation.

This proposal rests on the recognition that national security is relational. The OSCE’s 1999 Charter for European Security places the principle of indivisible security alongside states’ freedom to choose their security arrangements. This freedom, however, is limited and confined by a nation’s geopolitical position and security environment. The political challenge is to reconcile these commitments through arrangements that protect sovereignty while reducing mutual insecurity. My argument for neutrality is strategic reconciliation as a voluntary act of political prudence, rather than a claim that another state possesses an unrestricted veto over Ukraine’s choices.

Military guarantees, buffer zones, and peacekeeping deployments must therefore be judged by the political settlement they serve. Such instruments may manage immediate dangers, but they cannot independently resolve the underlying confrontation. If the parties continue to regard Ukraine as the decisive arena of a struggle for strategic supremacy, an armed pause may preserve the conditions for another war.

Neutrality also requires reciprocity. Russia would need to respect Ukraine’s sovereignty and accept credible obligations of restraint. Western governments would need to support a security arrangement that does not reproduce the competition the settlement seeks to overcome. A verifiable framework of non-aggression, transparency, and consultation could lend practical substance to these commitments.

Domestic renewal is equally necessary. Political pluralism, linguistic and religious rights, and inclusive government would strengthen legitimacy and reconciliation. Disputed territories would require carefully negotiated transitional arrangements, protection against coercion, and conditions under which future political choices could be expressed freely. Their status cannot responsibly be reduced to a slogan.

The trilogy’s ultimate argument is that peace begins with a recovery of judgment. Recognition allows adversaries to understand each other’s concerns; responsibility requires them to examine their own decisions; and restraint translates that understanding into limits on power. For Ukraine, I contend that neutrality in the form of Strategic Restraint offers the most viable foundation for bringing these principles to fruitful reconciliation.

The task of statesmanship is to create conditions under which people can live without serving as instruments of permanent geopolitical confrontation. That demands intellectual honesty, moral seriousness, and the courage to pursue a peace whose durability matters more than its rhetorical presentation.

Videos for further illumination of the subject matter: 

The Grand Chessboard: The Doctrine That Changed Everything | Ukraine and the Grand Chessboard

Machiavelli vs Kant: The Battle for Ukraine's Soul 

Why Is Zelensky Still In Power? Zelensky As The Real Obstacle To Peace 

Russophobia - Achilles’ Heel of US-Russia Relations

The demonizing of Russia and specifically of Vladimir Putin has been profoundly regretful and damaging to global affairs in recent years. It appears the U.S. could not rise above the old animosity vis-à-vis the follower nation to the Soviet Union that dominated bi-polar relations during the Cold War. In the quarter-century since, the United States, in its leading role in NATO and cooperation with the European Union, has pursued interventionist policies. Those aimed at global predominance and strengthening its position as the sole remaining superpower.

The U.S. and its partners wasted the opportunities to establish a righteous new world order the post-Cold War security environment offered. As I've made clear in my blog entries over the past years, geopolitical misconceptions paired with strategic hubris and ideological delusions as rampant in the White House and the State Department regimes led to utterly folly in foreign affairs international relations. Besides the undermining and destruction of nation-state structures in the Middle East and the intentional armed support of extremists and insurgents, color revolutions have been backed by the U.S. and E.U., for example, in Georgia and Ukraine. Central to the failed policies was the stunning neglect of legitimate national and strategic interests of other players in international relations.

The latter fact became painfully visible in the wake of the regime change in Ukraine. Every reasonably informed scholar of strategic and security studies could have foreseen the control of Crimea and eastern Ukraine's support by Russia. The installation of a puppet regime in Kiev by Washington and Berlin was unacceptable to Russia after the U.S. had pushed toward her borders through aggressive NATO expansion. To drive Russia out of its Black Sea ports and potentially prepare full-fledged membership of Ukraine, as the geostrategic 'Near Abroad,' in NATO would be intolerable for Russia. The blatant disregard of legitimate Russian interests went along with the infamy of blaming Russia for imperialism that had been clearly and unashamedly pushed by the U.S. and the transatlantic alliance.

It is impossible to accurately verify the degree to which strategic ignorance, national hubris, indifferent imperialism, pseudo-democratic universalism, or apparent economic interest and pressure from the military-industrial complex have led to the failed policy design. Yet, the miserable Pax Americana attempted in the last quarter-century was certainly a conglomerate of all these and probably more factors. In conjunction with Putin's demonization and the artificial preservation of Russia as the primary geopolitical enemy, western powers set the course for missing out on establishing a functioning global post-Cold War world order, including meaningful collaboration for containment of radical Islam. The outrageous claim of the Democratic Party that Russian hacking and cyber intervention lost the election for Hillary Clinton –probably one of the biggest scams in politics ever suggested– further exacerbated the relations with Russia. Mr. Obama's decision to expatriate Russian diplomats and impose additional sanctions under the pretense of Russia's alleged interference in the U.S. presidential elections will rank prominently among the many political follies this man has perpetrated.

The new administration under President Donald Trump, which alone gave hope to conquer the old resentments toward Russia and alleviate the damage the previous administration had caused, appears to be succumbing to the Russophobe and Putin-hating pressure forces in the U.S. Senate, the U.S. Congress, and the media. The new U.S. Ambassador's aggressive speech to the United Nations, Nikki Haley, and the ousting of security advisor General Flynn based on informal conversations with the Russian ambassador provides sad testimony to that assessment.  

Overcoming the hysteria vis-à-vis Russia and its leader Vladimir Putin has to be considered the number one priority in U.S. foreign affairs. Maintaining Russia artificially as an enemy image for a new Cold War and conventional arms race must be ended. A mindful and critical, yet simultaneously constructive and respectful relationship with Russia from the part of the United States is long overdue, for whose materialization the numerous challenges to international relations and global security offer ample opportunity. Russia has to be part of fighting the Islamic State and radical Islamism worldwide and has to play a role in stabilizing the Middle East. While mutually respecting legitimate national interests, a balance of power should result in the pursuance of common objectives and joint ends in global affairs.

But this might require prominent representatives of society and state in the U.S. to stop calling Mr. Putin a murderer, abandoning the sanctions regime, and acknowledging Russia's legitimate strategic and economic interests concerning the Caucasus, Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Middle East. It will also necessitate the easing up of U.S. and NATO forces' aggressive posture in the Baltic States and Eastern Europe.

The new administration must not continue the insanity of the Obama years. The step from considering Russia as a geopolitical enemy toward Russia as a geostrategic counterpart and potential collaborator in global affairs must take place now. In light of Western Christian societies' Islamic subversion, this appears to be a strategic necessity and social obligation.