What the Ukraine war has revealed with unusual clarity is not merely a crisis of security, but a crisis of judgment. This issue remains unresolved in ongoing peace negotiations, which only deepen the dilemma rather than resolve it. Consequently, these discussions have failed to yield meaningful progress towards peace.
At the core of this failure lies a fundamental epistemological error: the inversion of cause and effect. Friedrich Nietzsche, in his work Twilight of the Idols, identified this confusion as one of the most persistent and dangerous mistakes in human reasoning. He argued that people tend to moralize outcomes while ignoring the conditions that produced them and tend to treat effects as origins while elevating consequences into causes.
This error is not confined to mental acrobatics and philosophical speculations where it might lead to a stalemate in debate. In politics it results in catastrophic outcomes affecting real lives.
The war in Ukraine is commonly depicted as a geopolitical rupture—a sudden breakdown of order, an eruption of irrational aggression, a moral shock to Europe. Although this interpretation appears comforting, it is fundamentally incorrect. Wars of this magnitude do not arise from fleeting moments of madness; rather, they emerge from long chains of reasoning, diplomatic efforts, and moral failures that precede the first shot fired by years, sometimes even decades.
The case in point is Russia’s annexation of Crimea in 2014—eight years before the war’s commencement. In Western political and media narratives, Russia’s annexation of Crimea is frequently cited as the origin of the conflict and as a first step in supposed imperial expansion.
However, this interpretation reverses cause and effect and lays a harmful judgmental error at the foundation of the conflict.
Following the Maidan uprising, Russia faced—for the first time—a government in Kiev openly committed to NATO membership and hostile to Russian strategic interests. This was not a marginal concern. It directly threatened Russia’s access to the Black Sea and the operational viability of its southern naval forces.
In strategic terms, therefore, the annexation of Crimea was not an expansionist indulgence, but a defensive necessity. One may dislike this reality. But once ignored strategic reasoning is abandoned altogether; a neglect that has persisted ever since.
The same error in thinking – inverting cause and effect – has been applied to Russia’s Special Military Operation (SMO) that began in February 2022.
The prevailing Western narrative treats Russia’s military action as the cause of the conflict, rather than its effect. Acceptance of this false reversal—which is widespread among Western security elites—leads to the collapse of moral judgment into mythology. Responsibility, guilt, and blame are assigned without thorough and impartial analysis, diplomacy degenerates into provocation, and war is recast as one-sided righteousness and political necessity, rather than acknowledged failure and moral disaster.
Strategic literacy—seemingly rare nowadays—once provided a safeguard against such illusions. Carl von Clausewitz already made us understand that war is never an isolated act; it is the continuation of political conflict by other means, embedded in context, and shaped by threat perceptions, ideological aspirations, and power ambitions. Western leaders have insisted that Russia launched a War of Aggression “without provocation,” a demonstrably false claim.
For years, Russia clearly and consistently articulated the existential threat posed by NATO expansion into Ukraine. Diplomatic channels were pursued and red lines were stated, but proposals were rejected or dismissed—at which point the strategic situation crossed a classical threshold.
While International Law does not explicitly address preemptive war—except possibly as an exception under Article 51's Collective Defense Clause—preemptive war is neither new nor inherently illegitimate from a moral perspective.
As previously explained in my blog essay of August 12/08/2025, “Alaska Summit: President Trump is Setting Himself Up for Failure! No Peace Without Ending Zelensky’s Destructive Role and Changing the EU’s Flawed Stance,” strategic theory suggests that preemptive action may be justified when existential threats are imminent, diplomatic remedies have been exhausted, and delay would irreversibly worsen the strategic position.
This certainly does not sanctify war, but it places it within the tragic logic of statecraft, rather than within moral mythology. To deny this logic is strategic infantilism and the declaration of moral inferiority.
Describing the war as “unprovoked” and demonizing its initiator is simply malicious propaganda.
The refusal of Western elites to acknowledge legitimate Russian security concerns, the instrumentalization of Ukraine as a forward strategic platform, and the systematic replacement of diplomacy with moral exhibitionism have created the conditions for war. Once these conditions were in place, escalation was no longer an aberration, but a structural outcome.
The tragedy of Ukraine can thus not be separated from the intellectual collapse of Europe’s post–Cold War order. Politics was stripped of philosophical seriousness; strategy was reduced to slogans, and moralising (not moral) language replaced genuine judgment. In such an environment, peace ceased to be a goal and became a rhetorical ornament.
This failure also explains why current peace proposals remain so implausible. Plans built around militarization, buffer zones, or permanent foreign troop deployments repeat the very logic that produced the war, promising stability through force while ignoring the underlying causes for insecurity.
History teaches a different lesson as outlined in the previous blog of 01/09/2025. In 1955, Austria regained sovereignty not through alignment, but through neutrality. By renouncing bloc politics, Austria transformed itself from a strategic object into a stabilizing subject. Neutrality was not weakness, but strategic intelligence grounded in restraint.
Applied to Ukraine, the logic is straightforward and highly relevant: a neutral Ukraine—outside NATO, free of foreign troops, and committed to peaceful coexistence—would remove the core driver of the conflict. Militarization should not and cannot secure sovereignty where predictability and restraint can.
The deeper lesson, however, goes beyond Ukraine. The war exposes what happens when politics loses its transcendental grounding—when duty, dignity, and moral responsibility are replaced by utility, ideology, and moralising posturing. In such a world, power is mistaken for principle, and destruction is justified as virtue.
All of this I’ve addressed in the Philosophy&Strategy video series on YouTube. I provide the links below. The forthcoming videos in this series will tackle the following three steps whose illumination is indispensable for peace in Ukraine: first, the epistemological error of attributing false causalities; second, the strategic misreading of aggression and responsibility; and third, the conditions of a sustainable peace rooted in neutrality rather than militarization.
YouTube Videos:
Idealistic Realism: Grand Theories of the 1990s: https://youtu.be/aXtt7QJBU2E
From Kant to Crisis: The Forgotten Foundation of Political Reason: https://youtu.be/1HCz7D-bhOM
The Brzezinski Curse: From the Grand Chessboard to the Ukraine War: https://youtu.be/uQp5Dq5iaNk
The Revival of Mises:Transcendental Economics in a Changing World: https://youtu.be/sRd71gDxELk
